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This work is an initial attempt to describe the interconnections among corporate governance, enterprise risk 
management, and the phenomena of inter-firm risk transfer that occurs in combination with firms’ income 
smoothing. Corporate governance is conceived as a set of rules according to which a firm is managed and governed 
by its top managers. Extant literature on corporate governance has pointed out the benefits of the adoption, at a firm 
level, of a comprehensive enterprise risk management process. We note that, although such an adoption favors the 
smoothing of a firm’s income, in smoothing the income a firm, it also gives rise to an inter-temporal transfer of risk 
from the firm itself to its stakeholders, specifically to suppliers and employees. Such transfer of risk depends on the 
strength of a firm contractual power and on the structural relationships established by a firm with its stakeholders. 
We therefore argue that larger-sized organizations affiliated with a business group are likely to smooth income to a 
greater extent than smaller-sized organizations unaffiliated with a business group. The paper also offers some 
discussions of the findings and points out some important issues to be addressed in future studies. 
Keywords: enterprise risk management, corporate governance, risk transfer, net operating income smoothing 
Introduction 
There is a broad consensus around scholars and practitioners that the effectiveness of a corporate 
governance system in a firm highly depends on the adoption of a comprehensive and organic enterprise risk 
management (ERM). For example, extant policy documents suggest governance structure to incorporate a risk 
management framework, making the ERM an integral part of the governance structure and process of a firm 
(e.g., see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2008). 
In such a view, the general goal of an ERM is to generate economic value through the coverage of firms’ 
business risk, on the one hand, and by exploiting the positive side of uncertainty conditions, on the other hand. 
The ERM has assumed increasing importance from a theoretical and a professional point of view. It is a 
common opinion that the capability of both financial and non-financial companies to create value – while 
following strategies for growth and/or for innovation in conditions of a relatively low volatility about net 
                                                        
Antonio Renzi, Ph.D., professor of business management, Department of Statistics Sciences, Sapienza University of Rome, 
Rome, Italy.  
Gianluca Vagnani, Ph.D., professor of business management, Department of Management, Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, 
Italy. 
DAVID  PUBLISHING 
D 
ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT AND INTER-TEMPORAL RISK TRANSFER 
 
106 
incomes – requires the adoption of a proper ERM. 
ERM is defined as a holistic tool (Alviunessen & Jankensgård, 2009) to face overall firm risks, taking into 
account the interrelations between different managerial issues, such as strategic planning, financial decision, 
operations, firm reputation (Nayak et al., 2010). From this perspective, Razali and Tahir (2011) argue that the 
general meaning of ERM is “(…) to integrate or aggregate all types of risks” (p. 32). According to Lam (2000) 
the ERM logic aims to create economic value by managing several types of risks (e.g., credit risk, market risk, 
and operational risk) through an integrated approach. The general idea is behind the ERM logic is to look, as 
much as possible, at a firm’s risk in a systemic logic, where internal and external pressures play a crucial role to 
manage such risks, given the several expectations coming from a firm’s stakeholders. Therefore, the ERM rises 
like an enlargement of the traditional risk management. In fact, during the nineties of the last century the risk 
management discipline attempted to find a common ground among the different, developed firms’ risk-metrics 
(related to financial investments and bank loans) to size a proper equity-capital level as a cushion against the 
failure risk. In such a research stream, traditional risk management tools are based on stochastic and statistical 
approaches aimed to figure out a unique value (or distribution of values) that shows a measure of a firm level of 
exposure to risk, without considering linkages between a firm’s risk and a firm’s risk and other internal and 
external stakeholders’ risks. Thus, traditional tools are inconsistent to manage business risks with a systemic 
logic. This doesn’t mean that traditional risk management and ERM are as alternatives to each other. The 
traditional risk management is an antecedent of ERM and techniques and methods coming from the traditional 
risk management field are useful for implementing the quantitative component of ERM process. 
The increasing attention attributed to the ERM in the creation of economic value has led to even greater 
interactions between risk management mechanisms and the corporate governance system at the firm level. 
Basically, the holistic view that is proper of the ERM implies an involvement of the company board of directors 
with respect to both methods of risk analysis and periodic objectives that managers in charge of the ERM 
process must pursue in terms of mitigation and of exploitation of the overall risks related to a given firm. 
Consequently, the complementarity between corporate governance and ERM increased since the latter has been 
considered more and more as a critical driver to combine strategic objectives and actions with a relative low 
volatility of a company’s performance or, in other words, with a smoothed flow of income over time. The basic 
idea is that a good corporate governance system must deal, at a firm level, with both specific risks along with 
their interactions and a firm’s business risk as a whole. Moreover, ERM system not only provides clear 
information about the linkages between strategic opportunities and risk exposure, but also it offers methods and 
models able to support a manager’s attempt to effectively exploit the negative side of the business risk (or 
downside risk) as well as its positive side (or upside risk). Such a role of ERM is linked with the concept of real 
income smoothing that is “due to economic/physical/organizational (but not accounting) decisions made. These 
could include timing of particular investments like machinery and equipment, new venture expenditures, 
advertising, and a host of other activities. The smoothing literature makes the case that 1) this activity is in fact 
economic and, well done, can raise long run average profits, and that 2) successful managers have the 
flexibility to engage in such smoothing” (Bowman, 1980, p. 19). 
Extant studies concerning the relationships between ERM and corporate governance have focused on the 
micro-level of analyses (i.e., the individual organization) and on a firm’s benefit that, with corporate 
governance goals, stem from the adoption of proper ERM processes, in terms of both greater returns, lower 
volatility of such results associated to greater opportunities of a manager to smooth a firm’s income (Klumpes, 
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Wang, Tang, & Abhyankar, 2011). Kleffner, Lee and McGannon (2003) have included, among the benefits of 
the adoption of ERM, “an increased awareness of nonoperational risks by operational risk management 
personnel and an increased awareness of operational risks by nonoperational risk management personnel, more 
coordination with different areas responsible for risk management, and more involvement and interactions in 
the decision making of other departments” (p. 53). Other benefits are associated to an increase of a firm’s 
financial and market performance (Hoyt & Liebenberg, 2011) and “the introduction and development of ERM 
systems is deemed to reduce direct and indirect costs of financial distress and earnings variability [income 
smoothing], as well as negative surprises in financial markets. Moreover, it may improve the decision-making 
processes to select the best investment opportunities. As a consequence, ERM may favor the increase of firm 
value” (Florio & Leoni, 2017, p. 56).  
Despite the meaningful contributions provided by extant literature on the benefits of the adoption of the 
ERM at the firm level, one potential, but relevant, although unintended, consequence of such adoption decision 
that has been neglected is the induced inter-firms risk transfer. Specifically, we may analyze the 
interdependence between ERM and corporate governance from a broader point of view by considering that the 
risk management process comprises a firm and its task environment, the latter composed by its suppliers, 
customers, and partners. In particular, our research idea is to enlarge traditional studies about the interrelations 
between corporate governance and ERM taking into account how such interrelations could be a driver of a risk 
transfer from the focal organization to other organizations that belong to its task environment.  
Our paper aims to find new research areas by combining micro and macro issues tied to corporate 
governance, ERM, and inter-firm transfer of risk. We base the starting point of our work on the following set of 
assumptions. A firm complies to the ERM and to the corporate governance rules will reduce a firm business 
risk, while maintaining or improving the profitability level. Moreover, the reduction of a firm risk, as measured 
by a smoothed flow of income, combined with a top level of profitability, requires a firm to create a negotiated 
environment in which it can externalize its business risk through risk transfer mechanisms. Finally, the risk 
transfer, to maximize the overall risk-return profile, could favor some firm’s stakeholders and harm others. 
Starting from the above assumptions, the article focused on the relationship between ERM and corporate 
governance and how this relationship will lead to an inter-temporal risk transfers, induced by the aim to smooth 
a firm’s income, specifically its net operating income, across different periods with selected stakeholders (e.g., 
suppliers). In addition, we propose some research hypotheses that stem from a related theoretical framework 
where the inter-temporal risk transfer intensity depends on the combination of firm size and of structural 
interactions established with its suppliers by a firm. Finally, we provide conclusions and some research 
perspectives. 
Enterprise Risk Management, Corporate Governance, and Income Smoothing 
The wide impact of ERM on several company areas and its role in terms of economic value creation are 
the foremost reasons for the relevance of the ERM within a firm’s corporate governance structure and processes. 
Nowadays, corporate governance rules deal more and more on the availability at the firm level of integrated 
risk management processes and systems for communicating the ERMs’ outcomes to external stakeholders. As 
suggested by extant studies, a firm adoption of the ERM depends also on both internal and external pressures 
that originate from a firm’s corporate governance system. For instance, Kleffner et al. (2003) found that the 
corporate governance is one of the most influential factors of a firm adoption of the ERM process. In the same 
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vein, PricewaterhouseCoopers (2008) found that in Finland corporate governance rules combined with external 
regulations play a decisive role in order to stimulate firms to adopt the ERM. 
One of the main corporate governance tasks is to define rules and procedures which aim, on the one hand, 
to increase company survival, and to spread firm information among different stakeholders. In the corporate 
governance perspective, the ERM plays a double role. On the one hand, it is an internal tool for both mitigating 
the downside of volatility and exploiting its upside. It will improve firms’ relationships with several 
stakeholders such as banks, financial investors, rating agencies, public authorities. For example, Jung and Yang 
(2013) provided evidences that earnings smoothing is a mechanism to decrease the credit risk perception by 
rating agencies and thus to improve firms’ relationships with the financial intermediaries. 
The above considerations lead us to look at the ERM process as because risk-return objectives defined at 
company level by its board of directors. The latter decision makers are influenced by the expectations projected 
on them by several economic actors (e.g., bondholders, shareholders). However, the judgment about the quality 
of a certain ERM process may be given only in relative terms. For example, a traditional financial trader, who 
aims to achieve high returns in the short run, will be much interested in an ERM process able to optimize the 
risk-return in a short run. A stakeholder interested in achieving financial performance in the long run, will look 
at an ERM process able to create sustainable value over longer time periods. Despite such unique perspectives, 
all stakeholders pay attention to firms’ capability to hedge negative shocks with shocks of opposite sign and, 
thus, to a firm’s ability to smooth its income while keeping its level to a chief point. This leads the corporate 
governance members to use the ERM process to smooth a firm’s income (which implies, given the return, a 
lower risk) even in very adverse conditions. They may create a negotiated environment and externalize to 
different players of such an environment (e.g., suppliers, partners) the volatility of performances caused by 
internal and or external risk factors. 
In risk-return analysis, several studies, belonging both finance and accounting, tried to link internal firm 
features with idiosyncratic and systemic risk. A greater part of such studies focused on operating and financial 
leverage as internal determinants which will amplify the equity stock risk premium (e.g. Hamada, 1972; 
Mandelker & Rhee, 1994). The basic idea is: given a certain intrinsic business risk level, the operating leverage 
affects positively the unlevered risk (or operating risk) and financial leverage is likely to cause a positive 
difference between levered and unlevered risk (Ho, Xu, & Yap, 2004, p. 400).  
Concerning the unlevered risk, the potential operating leverage degree depends on the ratio of fixed costs 
to operating income. This means that, ceteris paribus, an increase in the level of fixed costs acts positively on 
the net operating income elasticity against revenue changes. The potential degree of operating leverage, for 
fixed costs, amplifies the positive correlation between the net operating income or EBIT (earnings before 
interests and taxes) and revenue changes. A high operating leverage level could then act positively and 
negatively on the risk-return trade-off. It is a driver for a strong exploitation of economy of scale and/or scope 
during a period of growth in revenues; instead, in a period of decline in revenues, a high operating leverage 
level will reduce the EBIT. The potential degree of operating leverage arises as an internal driver of the EBIT 
volatility. The standard deviation of EBIT depends from the combination between the volatility in revenues and 
the operating cost structure (Renzi, Sancetta, & Orlando, 2017). Given a firm’s revenues (REV) and net 
operating income (EBIT), we derive the effective degree of operating leverage (DOL) from the following 
expression. 
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Given the firm’s fixed costs (FC), we express the potential degree of the operating leverage (DOLP) 
according to the following equation. 
 
If fixed costs, price per unit and variable cost per unit are constants, then it follows that DOL= DOLP and 
Standard deviation of Ebit
 
A firm can avoid or mitigate the effect of shocks in revenues on its net operating income if it can change 
its cost structure by modifying the purchasing conditions (in terms of volume and/or price) of production inputs 
and the level of its fixed costs, those associated with employees. Yet, as shown in Figure 1, a firm’s attempt to 
change its cost structure may originate an inter-temporal transfer of risk to suppliers and employees. 
 
 
Figure 1. Net operating income smoothing and the decrease of the operating leverage effect on the unlevered volatility 
through a transfer risk process 
 
Changes in variable costs of inputs or in fixed costs, will reduce the effective operating leverage (DOL) 
well below the level of the potential operating leverage level (DOLp) (see Figure 1). Therefore, we write the 
following inequality. 
Standard deviation of Ebit
 
A firm can achieve the income smoothing by accounting techniques (i.e., defined as artificial smoothing) 
and/or by real changes in its operations (i.e., defined as real smoothing). Concerning the latter, Huang, Chang, 
and Chou (2008) used a real option perspective and provided evidence on firms’ smoothing strategies within 
the production planning activity to hedge profits against shocks on demand forecasting. Concerning the former 
smoothing, Albrecht and Richardson (1990, p. 713) argue that “artificial smoothing occurs when management 
manipulates the timing of accounting entries to produce smooth income streams”. An artificial smoothing 
occurs when a firm compensates external shocks by accounting operations and/or by financial decisions which 
hide the real volatility of its performances in a period. The artificial smoothing performed by a manager, by 
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either respecting or eluding the accounting law (Worthy, 1984), implies a profit manipulation that will cause 
not only a difference between a firm’s economic income under volatility conditions and the dynamic of a firm’s 
accounting results, but also “due to continuing and flexible treatment of reserves, i.e. bad debt, obsolete 
inventory, business closing” (Bowman, 1980, p. 20), better hedging conditions of a firm against business risks. 
We tie the latter type of artificial smoothing and the real smoothing to a typical ERM goal that consists in 
controlling and hedging as much as possible the operational and financial drivers of firms’ performances 
volatility by acting on firms’ operations. 
We argue that both real and artificial smoothing imply an inter-temporal transfer of unlevered risk, 
considered as a one period risk externalization which may increase and reduce symmetrically the remuneration 
of both suppliers and employees. Risks that a firm cannot eliminate by diversifying its sales activities can be 
“averaged over time in a way that reduces their impact on individual welfare. One hedging strategy for 
non-diversifiable risks is the use of the intergenerational risk sharing, which spreads the risks associated with a 
given stock of assets across generations with heterogeneous experiences” (Allen & Gale, 1997, p. 525). Given 
the concept of income smoothing and considering the pressures that stem from corporate governance rules to 
reduce a firms’ risk, we argue that, at a firm level, the adoption of the ERM will favor a firm’s attempt to 
smooth its income. Such an attempt is likely to give rise to an inter-temporal risk transfer of firms to its 
negotiated environment components (e.g., suppliers, employees). 
 
 
Figure 2. Revenues volatility, corporate governance pressures, ERM, and the smoothing of EBIT 
 
Figure 2 shows a path where the potential EBIT volatility, caused by the interaction between shocks in 
revenues and the potential operating leverage level, rises like an input to stimulate within a corporate 
governance system a firm to adopt the ERM process. Such adoption is likely to favor a firm’s attempt to 
smooth its EBIT via risk transfer processes to its negotiated environment components. The inter-temporal 
unlevered risk transfer is then a consequence and a condition to smooth a firm’s income using relationships 
with its negotiated environment components. 
The proposed Figure 2 suggests that the adoption of an ERM at a firm level may produce positive and 
negative consequences for different stakeholders included in a firm negotiated environment, when a firm 
reduces its risks via an associated inter-temporal risk transfer. For instance, a transfer of unlevered risk to a 
Expected shocks 
in revenues 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Potential volatility 
of operating income 
caused by potential 
operating leverage  
Corporate 
governance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enterprise risk 
management 
Unlevered risk 
transfer towards 
suppliers and employees 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Operating income 
smoothing 
Decreasing 
of effective 
operating 
leverage 
ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT AND INTER-TEMPORAL RISK TRANSFER 
 
111
firm’s supplier to compensate an expected non-diversifiable reduction in revenues, would decrease the credit 
risks incurred by one or more loan banks, yet increase the business risk of a firm’s suppliers. The above 
example is under the corporate governance perspective since a firm’s attempt to smooth the EBIT by leveraging 
its established relationships with its suppliers and/or employees is conducive to reduce a firm’s credit risk and 
to improve the focal firm’s relationships with bank(s) or others financial actors. 
Research Hypotheses and Theoretical Framework 
The above conceptualization about the inter-temporal transfer of unlevered risk comes from the corporate 
governance pressures on a firm to adopt the ERM as a way of smoothing net operating income under revenue 
volatility conditions. We then propose a new theoretical framework in which a firm attempts to smooth its 
income, and thus to reduce its business risk, depends on two main factors: the firm size and its affiliation with a 
business group, with the latter defined as a set of legal independent firms linked by formal and informal ties, 
accustomed, with a different extent, to take coordinated decisions and actions and subject to a holding company 
(Khanna & Yafeh, 2005). In addition, we argue that the income smoothing via cost of goods purchased, which 
implies a transfer of unlevered risk towards suppliers, is more achievable than via the cost of employees, which 
requires a transfer of unlevered risk toward laborers. In particular, our theoretical framework starts from the 
following four hypotheses. 
HP1—The extent of income smoothing that is achieved by managers of firms by acting on the cost of 
goods purchased, which implies a transfer of unlevered risk linked to revenue volatility towards suppliers, is 
likely to be greater in the cases of larger-sized corporations affiliated with a business group than in 
smaller-sized corporation unaffiliated with a business group; 
HP2—The difference in the extent of income smoothing that is achieved by managers of firms in 
group-affiliated companies compared to group-unaffiliated companies is greater than the same difference in 
larger-sized organizations compared to smaller-sized ones; 
HP3—The extent of income smoothing that is achieved by managers of firms with a greater extent by 
acting on the cost of goods purchased than on the cost of employees; 
HP4—The income smoothing that is achieved by managers of firms acting on the cost of employees is 
likely to occur with greater extent in smaller-sized corporations than in larger-sized ones. 
We link the first hypothesis with both the unbalanced power concept and structural interactions within a 
business group’s (or structural interactions) effects. In particular, larger-sized corporations have a high 
contractual power in their relationships with a number of smaller-sized suppliers (Barla, 2000). Suppliers of a 
large-sized corporation are often forced to work in “captive conditions”, to define, period by period, the 
dynamic of prices per unit and sales volumes of their goods. This implies that larger-sized corporations may 
have a large margin to mitigate the negative volatility of their revenues by reducing purchase prices and/or 
quantity of the production inputs. Concerning the role of structural interactions, firms belonging to a business 
group can exploit intra-group interactions for compensating revenue volatility by acting on costs which come 
from other organizations of the same group (Dewenter, 2003). The income smoothing process within a group 
can occur vertically or horizontally. Vertically in the sense that the parent company can optimize resources and 
related costs by moving activities and production factors from one company to another of the group, or even by 
intervening on the prices and volumes of those companies that act within the group as suppliers. From a 
horizontal point of view, the smoothing process occurs via formal or informal agreements established between 
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two or more firms, belonging to a group linked to each other by commercial, strategic, and/or technological 
interconnections. 
The second hypothesis suggests that belonging to a group allows a firm more strongly than the firm   
size to smooth the income based on inter-temporal unlevered risk transfer. This hypothesis comes from the idea 
that structural interactions, which typically characterize firms’ interactions within a group, strongly the 
possibility to transfer unlevered risk from one firm to another than the case of an unaffiliated firm with a 
business group. In the latter case, the income smoothing is achieved via interactions with group-unaffiliated 
companies which, free from group structural relationships and thus subjected to no coercive power from a third 
party, have more room to decide whether to accept a risk transfer from another entity or not. In other words, 
group-unaffiliated firms have the freedom to opt out from intertemporal trade and renege on all existing 
contracts with other entities. For group-unaffiliated, the only punishment for doing so, and hence the only 
enforcement mechanism for contracts, is that agents that choose to default on their contracts are banned from 
future intertemporal trade. Consequently, the group-affiliated companies exhibit a greater propensity to transfer 
risks with other companies of the business group than the group-unaffiliated companies with other firms. In this 
vein, Nakatani (1984) shows that the variance of operating profitability (and growth rates) is lower for 
group-affiliated companies than unaffiliated firms. 
The third hypothesis depends, on the one hand, on the particular nature of human resources. A firm does 
not own human resources. Therefore, these are resources characterized by a greater rigidity in terms of 
remuneration and reallocation (Jacoby & Mitchell, 1990). In addition, given the flexible terms that often 
characterize the purchasing contracts, often combined with the adoption of target costing approaches at a firm 
level (Kato, 1993), considering the more rigid terms implied in labor contracts and the implied protection 
granted for employees within current regulation, we expect that companies rely more on the cost of goods 
purchased to a greater extent than cost of employees to smooth operating income. 
The fourth hypothesis comes from the more protections, in terms of salary and work stabilization, that 
human resources receive in larger-sized corporations compared to smaller-sized ones (e.g., see Miller & 
Mulvey, 1996). The unions’ role in protecting workers’ rights is relevant in larger-sized corporations; unions 
themselves can reap more extended economies of scale. Large organizations pay attention to that part of human 
resources who own key knowledge and skills, which play a crucial role to archive successful strategies and 
related economic performances. Larger-sized organizations give more weight to work disruptions and to loss of 
key human resources associated to wage changes than smaller-sized organizations (Agell & Bennmarker, 2007). 
In a larger-sized corporation context, human resources often produce sunk costs because of contractual 
constraints and strategic issues which further attenuate the possibility to vary salaries and the number of 
employees to smooth income. 
According to the above hypotheses, we base our theoretical framework on a matrix with four regions. The 
horizontal side concerns the structural interactions within a business group; its vertical side regards the firm 
size (see Figure 3).  
 
ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT AND INTER-TEMPORAL RISK TRANSFER 
 
113
 
Figure 3. Inter-temporal risk transfer matrix. 
 
The “North-West Region” includes cases in which both firm size and structural interactions are high. It 
means that group-affiliated, larger-sized organizations included in this region may have a greater margin to 
smooth EBIT by transferring towards suppliers a high quote of their revenues volatility than group-unaffiliated, 
smaller-sized firms. According to HP1, a group-affiliated, large-sized organization is likely to possess the 
ability for exploiting its power and leverage available structural interactions to compensate revenue volatility. 
Regarding the unlevered risk transfer towards employees, the “North-West Region” implies, somehow a lower 
possibility about a firm to transfer the inter-temporal unlevered risk to employees given the highest protection 
and sometimes the strategic importance that human resources play, in larger-sized corporations (HP3, HP4). 
However, in our theoretical framework, a firm can mitigate the low possibility to transfer revenue volatility to 
employees by leveraging structural interactions, allowing a firm to move an employee from one company to 
another and use an employee to provide service to another company which will pay for her salary (HP2). 
The “North-East Region” shows cases of group-unaffiliated, large-sized organizations. Such firms have a 
potentially high level of power (HP1) but cannot leverage structural interactions that stem from firms affiliated 
with a business group to smooth the income via inter-temporal risk transfer. Therefore, “North-East Region” 
regards those firms that may compensate volatility in revenues with an extent that is high/medium, by changing, 
for example, the price per unit of inputs and/or volume of inputs purchased, and may make small revenues 
volatility compensations by acting on salaries and on the number of employees. 
The “South-West Region” is about the case of group-affiliated, smaller-sized organizations. According to 
our theoretical framework, these firms have a low/medium margin to smooth EBIT by changing the 
price/volume conditions with its suppliers and the medium margin about to smooth EBIT by modifying fixed 
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costs coming from human resources (HP4).  
The “South-East Region” includes group-unaffiliated, smaller-sized companies. Such companies do not 
possess both market power and structural interactions. These firms are likely to smooth income with very little 
extent, since they will find it difficult to transfer risks to both suppliers and employees. The two “Regions” in 
matrix’s downside have in common to each other a greater flexibility in managing human resources, which is 
common in smaller-sized organizations. 
Conclusions and Perspectives 
Our paper provides a first attempt to develop a theoretical framework able to connect corporate 
governance, enterprise risk management, income smoothing, and inter-temporal risk transfer from a firm to its 
stakeholders in its negotiated environment. From such a framework we develop hypotheses which require a 
future empirical analysis to test them. Performing such empirical analysis, which is at the top of our research 
agenda will allow one to verify the extent to which the “matrix of inter-temporal risk transfer” is consistent 
with the actual companies’ behavior in terms of income smoothing and unlevered risk transfer under revenue 
volatility conditions to suppliers and employees.  
The proposed theoretical framework is also implications for theory building and practice at both micro and 
macro levels of analysis.  
At the micro-level of analysis, this work can be considered as the starting point for modeling, in a 
managerial perspective, the unlevered risk analysis, taking into account how a manager of a firm can manage 
internal and external relationships to vary her firm exposure to risk caused by the volatility of revenues. This 
may open the door to other several managerial issues, where the links between the smoothing process and the 
risk transfer strategies matter to optimize a firm’s investment decision. Such links are also relevant for other 
related managerial choices, such as the selection suppliers, the definition of the risk premium as a crucial 
component of the capital cost measurement, the improvement of the relationship between a firm and one or 
more actors of the financial system.  
We believe that, from a micro-level of analysis, this first theoretical conceptualization can be enlarged by 
considering strategic constraints that a firm is likely to face in smoothing its income based on the transferring of 
revenues’ volatility to third parties. An interesting issue concerns the counterparty risk aversion. For instance, 
in a business-to-business market, a high-risk aversion of a supplier can produce initial higher costs of inputs for 
a buyer trying to transfer the volatility of its revenues to such a supplier. The above situation could happen 
when the supplier has a certain contractual power to define contractual latitudes and economic conditions. In 
addition, a high intensity of inter-temporal risk transfer from a firm to a supplier could act negatively on the 
economic value when it destroys crucial relationships with key suppliers and/or with human resources that 
possess high-specific capabilities. If the risk transfer processes exceed certain limits, this could create 
destructive effects on the economic value even with a low contractual power of suppliers and/or employees. An 
excessive transfer of the volatility of revenues could weaken the relationships of a firm with both its suppliers 
and employees, with further negative consequences for the firm itself in terms of reduced capacity to either 
produce high-quality products or achieve high levels of efficiency. Therefore, the matrix of inter-temporal risk 
transfer can be deepened, taking into account a set of constraints relating to the relationships that a firm has 
with internal and external stakeholders.  
At the macro level of analysis, our theoretical framework provides a way to analyze systemic risk in a 
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fresh perspective. The systemic risk has been the object of increasing attentions since the last financial crisis. 
This has produced distinct ways to formalize the systemic risk concept. The systemic risk definition change is 
in relation to several perspectives (Smaga, 2014). However, extant studies about systemic risk focused on 
financial system, according to a macro-economic perspective. The few micro studies in this field inquire 
linkages between capital structure police at a single firm level and capital market instability. So far scholars 
have not deepened the linkages between strategies at the firm level aimed to smooth operating income, risk 
transfer from a single firm to its third parties in the negotiated environment, and systemic risk. Our theoretical 
model offers some insight to fill this gap, considering the domino and/or network effects connected to the 
tendency of non-financial companies to transfer business risk to their suppliers, which could adopt forms of risk 
transfer to other players in their negotiated environment. This process of risk transfer can determine a cascade 
effect which could be like that occurring within financial networks characterized by interconnected actors. 
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